This paper is one of the first studies to empirically examine the nature and cause of financial distress in an emerging market context. This is important given the impact of the recent global privatisation phenomenon. These privatised firms have since been subject to a new competitive environment, redefined objectives and management incentives. In this context, we investigate the characteristics of a sample of 100 distressed firms in China between 1999 and 2003. Existing bankruptcy and distress literature cites two main causes of financial distress: debt overhang and economic distress. By comparing the distressed firms' financial and operating performance with that of their respective industries, we conclude that corporate distress in China is caused predominantly by firm level poor performance, not by leverage. Our evidence indirectly speaks to the debate that financial renegotiations between distressed firms and their creditors are inefficient. In addition, our sample provides a unique opportunity to study how (partial) government ownership affects firm performance and efficiency in the context of financial distress and soft budget constraints.
INTRODUCTION
We investigate the nature, cause and characteristics of corporate distress in China. This topic of corporate distress in the context of emerging economies is under-researched. Given the impact of privatisation to the world's economic landscape in recent times 2 , our study on corporate distress in China sheds light on our understanding of early signs of distress, and provides implications for the design of an efficient mechanism through which viable firms survive while the non-viable ones do not, thus ensuring assets of poor performers are reallocated to better uses.
Prior to privatisation, many state owned enterprises (SOE) in emerging markets were highly leveraged. Claessens et al. (1999) record that most East Asian countries had private claims exceeding GDPs and suggest that one cause of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 was corporate debt overhang and financial distress. However, the high level of leverage of these former SOEs was significantly reduced following privatisation, especially in those privatised LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes 1999, Barberis et al 1996) . In the new competitive postprivatisation environments, inefficient or non-viable firms fail. Important questions arise: What is the cause of distress -are the distressed firms suffering from economic or financial distress?
Answers to this question provide important implications for the design of bankruptcy provisions and firm capital structures.
There are two competing views in the literature regarding the effect of financial distress on a firm's operating performance. Conditional on the successful distinction between financial and economic distress, Haugen and Senbet (1978) and Jensen (1986) argue that by applying the Coase Theorem, there are no effects of financial distress. Thus if a firm is in financial trouble because it has an inappropriate capital structure, creditors will restructure their claims to maximise firm value and remedy the situation. However, if the renegotiation of the financially distressed firm and its creditors is inefficient 3 , firms facing liquidity constraints will be forced to 2 According to D 'Souza et al (2001) , a cumulative value of over US$750 billion has been raised by governments through share-issue privatisation (SIP) alone since 1980. 3 Due to reasons such as information asymmetry and coordination failure.
forgo positive NPV investments, and there will be consequences for financial distress (Gertner & Scharfstein 1991) . If this is the case, appropriate regulation facilitating such renegotiation may be desirable.
Empirical results on the cause of distress using US data are not clear-cut. For example, Asquith et al. (1994) examine 102 US junk bond issuers in the 1970's and 80's and they believe the cause of distress was principally economic factors (economic distress). Contrary to their results, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) have negative operating income and therefore their sample firms are both financially and economically distressed.
Being an emerging market, China has a relatively under-developed financial market with associated greater information asymmetry due to market friction and (partial) state ownership (information asymmetry associated with state ownership will be discussed further in section 2).
Also, the existing bankruptcy procedure is rarely used 4 so there are no usable formal procedures to facilitate timely restructurings of firms in financial difficult. Given this context we hypothesise that financial distress and liquidity constraints lead to poor operating performance.
Different to the above-cited US studies, we take a more comprehensive approach by basing our study on an inclusive sample set, not restricting our sample to any particular type of distress.
Instead, our aim is to include all firms that are in financial difficulty in order to provide important insights on the interaction between financial and economic distress.
Capital expenditure is used as an indicator of financial constraints in the literature on investmentunder-uncertainty. This literature focuses on the importance of uncertainty 5 on investment, and the recent real option approach (Dixit & Pindyck 1994) argues that uncertainty negatively affects 4 There has not been any documented court supervised restructuring case among listed firms. 5 With respect to selling price, sales, stock prices, distress, etc.
investment. Fazzari et al (1988) introduced and popularised a methodology which compares the elasticity of investment with a measure of internal funds for different groups of firms, and a higher elasticity suggests firm uncertainty and more severe capital market constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that the Fazzari et al approach is flawed because it is only meaningful to look at differences in the elasticity of investment to cash flow if the investment-cash flow sensitivity is monotonically increasing with respect to the indicator used to classify firms. There is no consensus on these two competing views. However in this paper this is not deemed to be a critical issue as we are not investigating all possible relationships between capital market imperfections, uncertainty and their effect on investment. Suffice it to say we intend to use capital expenditure as an indicator of a distressed firm's liquidity constraints. Because distressed firms face acute uncertainty, this context is a particularly appropriate one to use capital expenditure as an indicator of liquidity constraints. It is also important to know that most empirical studies find a negative linear investment-uncertainty relationship (Lensink et al 2001) .
Intuitively, when firms are in financial distress and face financial constraints, capital reduction and asset sales can provide a quick solution to the liquidity problem. Asquith et al (1994) document dramatic capital expenditure reduction in their sample. They also argue that asset sales are important in providing much needed liquidity and that firms selling a large portion of their assets are considerably less likely to go bankrupt 6 . Although we do not address the effectiveness of asset sales in avoiding bankruptcy in our study, an investigation of behaviour of the distressed firms' capital expenditure and asset movements provide a good indication of the level of liquidity constraint these firms face when in distress.
Our sample also provides a unique opportunity to empirically detect the existence of soft budget constraints. The term "soft budget constraints" was first introduced by Kornai (1980) and has since become widely used in the emerging market literature. It refers to the case when a firm is not concerned with financial losses and expects to be bailed out by the government. In the light of this, two important questions arise: 1. Are the SOEs among our sample of distressed firms 6 Although the use of asset sales is restricted. Three potentially important barriers include: a).
conflicts between shareholders and creditors; b). managerial self-interest; and c). industry factors. For a thorough discussion, also see Shleifer & Vishny (1992) .
indeed in financial distress? 2. If these selected SOE firms are kept afloat by the government, do they have no or less liquidity constraint than their non-SOE counterparts?
To address the above raised questions, firstly we need to define distress in our study. In the current literature, two main measures are widely employed to locate firms in financial distress.
Market return reflects the market's interpretation and forecast of the firms' accounting information, firms' growth opportunities, and probably the market's anticipation of success/failure of distress restructuring. This measure is often calculated over a period of three
years. An accounting measure, interest cover (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation divided by interest expenses), on the other hand, is intended to measure, more directly, the ability of a firm to cover its current financial obligations.
Without prior systematic studies on distress in China, one indication of distress based on the legal literature (Asian Development Bank 1999 & 2000 , or ADB 1999 & 2000 is when debtors are unable to pay off the due debts. In addition, according the Company Law (Article 157 & 158), listed companies which have been making losses (negative net profit) for two consecutive years are categorised as "special treatment" (ST), whereas companies that have been making losses for three consecutive years are to be put into "Particular Treatment" (PT) status and are suspended from the Exchanges. ST firms are limited to 5% share-price movements up or down daily. PT firms are given a maximum one-year grace period to return to profitability, failing which they will be permanently de-listed from the Stock Exchange. Therefore a lack of profitability is perceived by the regulator as being distressed 7 .
We employ the interest coverage measure to identify distress. As a robustness check, we also define distress using the market measure and the "ST/PT" measure. There is a high overlap between different definitions and we repeat all analyses on the overlapped sample firms and find our results are consistent. We also repeat all analysis on distressed SOE firms in light of the issue of soft budget constraint, and also find our results to be robust.
7 Since the measure they use is net profit, which is an after-interest indicator, the regulations capture firms suffering from both financial and economic distress.
Our full sample includes 100 financially distressed firms and we have a number of key findings.
Firstly, at one year prior to the onset of distress, the distressed firms are significantly more highly leveraged than their industry and face severe liquidity constraints. Their prior-to-distress liquidity constraint is evident by their average capital expenditure (scaled by assets) being only one third of that of their industry. The distressed firms also seem to have difficulty paying their suppliers.
Secondly, the main characteristic of our sample of distressed firms is their poor operating performance. Overall, economic distress is responsible for 94% of distressed firms' cash-flow shortfall and with only 6% caused by the leverage effect. Our results confirm those of Asquith et al. (1994) . In addition, we find that the leverage factor plays a greater role in causing cash flow shortfall prior to the onset of distress than it does during distress, and this finding suggests that financial distress leads to economic distress. This suggests the absence of an efficient financial renegotiation process for companies in distress in China.
Thirdly, consistent with Asquith et al (1994) , distressed firms reduce capital expenditure dramatically. In addition, our sample of distressed firms also reduces their book value of assets significantly. These findings confirm the liquidity problems these firms face. In addition, we separate the 100 distressed firms into SOE and non-SOE subgroups and compare their investment behaviour prior to and during distress. We find that the non-SOE subgroup experiences a significantly greater reduction in capital expenditure and assets, both statistically and economically. One explanation is that non-SOEs have hard budget constraints and have no other alternatives than cutting investment and firm size, whereas their SOE counterparts have soft budget constraints, with the result that the reduction of investment and firm size is less severe.
Nontheless, the fact that SOEs significantly reduce investment over and above their industry median level, and that their performance overall is significantly worse than their industry, suggests that in the context of soft budget constraint, the SOE firms selected by our distress selection procedure are indeed distressed, albeit with different investment behaviour when facing distress. The existence of soft budget constraint does not seem to save the distressed SOEs being distressed, as these SOEs demonstrate deteriorating financial and operating performance relative to their industry, similar to the full sample of distressed firms. A multivariate logit model confirms our results that distressed firms' significant reduction of capital expenditure prior to distress is a precursor of the subsequent distress.
Finally, using one single accounting measure, we identify a group of seriously distressed firms which perform poorly across a range of accounting categories. This suggests that Chinese accounting data are more reliable than generally thought.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes some of the pertinent features of the institutional background for the listed companies in China; Section 3 describes our data and methodology. Section 4 presents our empirical findings. Section 5 presents our robustness checks. Section 6 summarises these findings and concludes.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
China is the most important emerging market and is in the process of financial liberalisation from a closed economy to a market oriented and an integrated economy. This section sets out the main sources of finance for listed Chinese companies, paying special attention to the continuing role of government.
China's privatisation process in the past two decades has dramatically transformed the structure of its corporate ownership. Economists argue that in competitive markets without significant externalities, government ownership is inferior to private ownership (Alchian 1977 , Sappington and Stiglitz 1987 , Shapiro and Willig 1990 , Hart et al. 1997 , due to government's lack of transferable residual claims, its political and social objectives over profit maximisation, and the associated greater information asymmetries and higher transaction costs. Vining and Boardman (1992) , and Megginson et al (1994) , among others, provide empirical support for such proposition. In contrast, Wortzel and Wortzel (1989) and Martin and Parker (1995) suggest that government ownership is not necessarily less efficient than private ownership.
There is inconclusive empirical evidence on the role of government in corporate China. Wei et al. (2003) and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and they are highly inefficient 9 . There was also significant government intervention in bank lending prior to 1994. Such government intervention could take place either ex ante or ex post of bank lending being made (Lu et al 2001) . Since 1994, the Chinese State banks have been granted increasing autonomy in their lending decisionmaking. 9 The cost/income ratio of mainland Chinese banks is among the highest in the world, averaging close to 80%, versus 35-45% in Asia and 40-55% internationally (Bank of China International 2002).
According to Lu et al. (2001) , the banks' lending decisions are systematically biased in favour of SOEs. They also find that the investment sensitivity to cash flow of the moderate-risk firms is substantially higher than that of the other firms, while investment of the worst-risk firms is the least responsive to changes in cash flow. This pattern of investment-cash-flow sensitivities suggests that, although banks do ration credits to some extent, they tend to provide liquidity to keep the borrowers in financial distress afloat.
As at 2001, the total number of listed companies is 1160. Of the total shares outstanding, 46.2%
were state owned shares and 36.6% were tradable shares. As we will discuss in section 3, 51% of our sample of distressed companies are SOEs, and the average tradable shares of these 100 firms at the onset of distress are 42.6%. So the selected sample set presents the population of our sample selection in terms of state ownership and tradability (market depth).
The Chinese Bankruptcy Law was initially promulgated to restructure or liquidate insolvent state owned enterprises. As China began to move towards a more market driven economy additional bankruptcy 10 legislation was enacted. Similar to many other countries, when a company is in distress, there are two possible routes for distress resolution: 1. Private workouts; 2. Bankruptcy process during which the company may be restructured under court supervision or liquidated 11 .
However, despite the existence of a legal procedure for the restructuring and/or liquidation of corporations, this process is seldom used. According to the World Bank (2000) , at the time of that study there had been no known cases of in-court restructuring in China 12 .
10 The term "Bankruptcy" follows the US definition and refers to the corporate bankruptcy process of court supervised restructuring or liquidation, and is used interchangeably with "insolvency" in this study. 11 A comparison of the main features of the Chinese bankruptcy laws with that of eight countries is attached as Appendix 2. 12 As pointed out by George Nast, principal consultant at McKinsey&Co China, in a communication with the authors, this situation is not unique to China. Distress resolution tends to be informal in many emerging markets and distressed firms tend to be kept alive much longer (the so called soft budget constraint syndrome (Kornai 1980) ).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In this section we describe our sample selection procedure and present the descriptive statistics of the sample. We also describe our methodology and define our variables.
THE SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE
Our sample selection procedure is designed to identify firms in severe financial difficulty. Our primary definition of distress is based on interest cover and operating performance, as this approach has been widely used in previous research and is in line with the measure used by the firms were selected using criterion (a) and 1 additional firm was selected using criterion (b).
Following the procedure, a total of 140 firms were classified as being distressed. The first year in which a firm meets one of the above two criteria is denoted year 0. Year -t (+t) denotes t years before (after) year 0. So year -1 is the year prior to the onset of distress, year 0 is the first year of financial distress and year 1 is the second year of distress.
Secondly, using the four-digit SIC code, 18 firms were found to be either in a monopoly or in a duopoly industry with both firms in distress, and thus were excluded from our study, since industry comparison is impossible. In addition, 19 firms do not have accounting information for either t=-1 or t=+1 and thus were also eliminated from our sample. This leaves 103 firms.
Lastly, among the 103 firms, 3 became dormant (sales = 0) during their respective distress periods and were also eliminated from the sample. The resulting sample consists of 100 firms and these 100 firms all had at least two consecutive years of interest cover less than one. The one firm selected by EBITDA being negative as its interest expense is zero was eliminated as it had no sales during distress.
Among the selected 100 firms identified as being distressed at some time during 1999-2003, 51% were controlled by the government, and 3% have foreign investors as their controlling shareholder. At the onset of distress, the average percentage of tradable shares to total shares of our sample is 42.6%. In addition, of the 100 sample firms, 73 suffered interest coverage shortfall for two consecutive years, 26 for three consecutive years and one firm for four consecutive years.
Summary statistics on the sample is provided in Table 1 . The mean book value of assets in year 0 is RMB1,473 million (approx. £100 million) and the median is RMB1,003 million (approx. £70 million). The median ratio of total liabilities to total assets is 62%, but 96% of total liabilities are current. Bank debt proxied by total debt, is 34% of total assets (median), in contrast to the average 22% ratio of average bank loans to total assets of all PLCs (Tian 2004) . Finally, the median interest coverage in year 0 is -2.85, indicating that the median firm in our sample was far from capable of meeting its interest payment obligations.
Insert Table 1 here.
TESTABLE PREDICTIONS, DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY
Our primary objective is to test the cause and nature of distress of our sample firms. To achieve this, we firstly use a range of accounting ratios to examine the features of our sample of distressed firms and adjust these accounting ratios by industry. We then evaluate the relative importance of economic versus financial causes of distress. We next examine the existence of soft budget constraints. Finally we investigate which combinations of the variables provide the strongest prior year indicator of forthcoming distress on a multivariate basis.
Insert Table 2 here Table 2 presents the list of empirical proxies we employ for firm performance and efficiency.
We firstly compute these empirical proxies for every distressed firm in our sample and its respective industry median, using the four-digit SIC code, for a three years period: one year prior to the onset of distress (t=-1), the first year of coverage shortfall (the year of onset of distress, t=0), and the second year of coverage shortfall (t=+1). We then calculate the median of each variable for the distressed firms and for the industry medians, as well as the difference between firm and industry median value. We employ the Wilcoxon singed-rank test to test for significance in the difference between firms and industry medians. Our conclusions are based on the standardised test statistic Z, which for samples of at least 10 follows approximately a standard normal distribution. As we can see in Table 1 , most of our data are highly skewed with extreme values. Jarque-Bera statistics confirm that the variables are not normally distributed. Given this condition, it is more appropriate to use non-parametric tests for our comparison analysis.
Having gained an understanding of the characteristics of the distressed firms prior to and during distress, we then adapt the methodology of Asquith et al. (1994) to assess the relative importance of leverage and firm operating performance in triggering distress. Cash flow is defined as EBITDA less interest expense; the ratio of interest expense to assets is used to proxy for leverage effect; and EBITDA to assets as a proxy for operating performance effect.
Two distinct changes in firm cash flow are calculated to represent leverage effect and firm operating performance effect. First, leverage effect is calculated as the improvement that would occur in the firm's cash flow in year 0 if the firm had the same ratio of interest expense to assets as the median firm in its industry; Second, firm operating performance effect is the improvement that would occur in the firm's cash flow in year 0 if the firm had the same ratio of EBITDA to assets as its industry median firm. The sum of the above two changes in cash flow is the total cash flow shortfall caused by distress. The portion of cash flow shortfall caused by leverage effect is the first calculated cash flow change divided by the sum of total cash flow shortfall. The portion of cash flow shortfall caused by firm performance effect is the second calculated cash flow change divided by the sum of total cash flow changes. The full details of the calculations are presented in Appendix 2.
Thirdly, we examine our sample firms' capital expenditure and assets in detail to provide insights on the issue of firm liquidity and soft budget constraints. We compute distressed firms' capital expenditure and asset growth during the three-year window. Large reductions in capital expenditure and assets indicate that the distressed firms face severe liquidity constraints. In addition, we separate the sample into SOE and non-SOE subgroups and we expect the SOE subgroup has less reduction in capital expenditure and assets, because they have less of a problem with liquidity due to soft budget constraints; whereas the non-SOE subgroup have greater reduction in capital expenditure and/or assets, as they are subject to hard budget constraints and have greater need to reduce the pressure of liquidity constraints.
Finally, having assessed the different causes of distress on a univariate basis, by matching each distressed sample firm with its industry median firm by interest coverage ratio in the same year,
we construct a logit model to test for the determinants of financial distress. The use of logit model is appropriate considering the distributional property of our data. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking on the value of zero if the firm is in distress and one otherwise. We expect leverage, operating performance, investment behaviour and other firm characteristics have significant effect on the probability of firm going into distress hence the independent variable is a vector of performance ratios prior to the onset of distress across the following categories:
operating performance (SALAS, EBITDAAS, and EBITDASAL), financial performance DLOC is a geographic location dummy, equal to 1 for firms with their headquarters located in major or coastal cities/districts such as Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan and Guangdong, and 0 otherwise. The rationale behind the location dummy is that these coastal cities and districts are potentially more advanced because of more efficient management and better educated workforce (Wei et al 2003) . It is also possible that the financial systems in the major and coastal areas are more advanced, not only for the reasons stated above, but also because foreign financial institutions have been permitted to operate in these regions since the early 1990s.
DummyAshare is a dummy to proxy for ownership types in the tradable shares, equal to 1 if the firm issued only A shares and 0 otherwise. In other words, the "0" firms have foreign investors as their (tradable) shareholders whereas the "1" firms have only domestic investors as their (tradable) shareholders. This dummy is to control for the potential impact of foreign ownership in the listed firms on the probability of distress. Lastly, Floating is a proxy for governance. It is also a representation of ownership concentration; as in situation of distress ownership concentration could be a positive factor with respect to overcoming coordination failure among shareholders.
14 firm's market-to-book ratio measuring the net present value of a firm's going concern value is being collected, preliminary result based on 80 data points provide strong results. 15 Both definitions of state ownership have been used in previous China studies. For a thorough discussion of this issue see Clarke (2003) .
As a robustness check, we select distressed firms using two alternative definitions of distress, namely the market return measure and the ST/PT measure. The market return measure is a widely employed methodology in previous research which selects firms that are in the bottom 5%
of three-year cumulative market returns of all listed firms; The ST/PT measure on the other hand, as discussed in the introduction, is used by the stock exchange regulators as an indication of distress. We form two subgroups by overlapping the firms selected by each of these two selection procedures with the 100 firms selected by our main distress selection procedure. We then repeat the univariate, cause of distress and multivariate analyses on the market return and the ST/PT subgroups. In addition, to produce more robust results, when running the logit model in the robustness test, we also consider the correlation matrix and adopt the backward/forward procedure to derive the most appropriate specifications, instead of merely using the significant independent variables from the full sample.
RESULTS

INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED FIRM PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY
In this section, the operating and financial performance, and the efficiency of the sample distressed firms is analysed in detail. Table 3 reports the results for the full sample for t=-1, 0 and +1. The results show that the distressed firms' overall operating and financial performance is significantly worse than their industry during all the three years (t=-1 to +1). At the 1% significance level, the median distressed firms' industry adjusted operating performance measured by EBITDA over assets is negative in year -1. This measure drops considerably from -0.0335 in year -1 to -0.133 in year 0 and continues to deteriorate through to year 1. This confirms that indeed the distressed firms suffer from poor operating performance 16 .
Insert Table 3 here 16 Using EBIT as a proxy for operating performance yield very similar results to EBITDA, so we only report the EBITDA results.
In addition, distressed firms' median sales scaled by assets are already significantly worse than industry median at year -1, and this situation deteriorates further in year 0. The trend continues to year +1. Interestingly, however, distressed firms' gross and operating profit margin is similar to industry median during t=-1 and these measures only become worse relative to industry in year 0.
The indication is that distressed firms' sales decline prior to and during distress. This explanation is confirmed by the significantly negative industry-adjusted sales/employee ratio in contrast to the insignificant industry-adjusted asset/employee ratio. This decline in sales could be the result of negative economic shock or firms passing up investment opportunities because of liquidity constraints.
The financial performance variables show that distressed firms' leverage is indeed higher than the industry median. The distressed firms' median industry adjusted total (current) liabilities to assets of -0.063 (-0.065) is significant, at the 1% level in year -1 and this ratio doubled in year 0.
Furthermore, although distressed firms' median accounts payable to total liabilities ratio drops from year -1 to year 0 and then to year +1, the continued increase in the accounts payable to sales ratios indicate that accounts payables continue to increase relative to sales, suggesting that distressed firms are having increased difficulty paying back their suppliers.
Current liabilities are a relatively weaker form of finance compared with long term liabilities.
From Table 3 we can see that for both the distressed firm and the industry median firm, current liabilities constitutes the same proportion of total liabilities, as the median changes between firm and industry median during the three-year period are insignificant. Thus the results suggest that in China, the common form of financing is provided in current liabilities, regardless whether or not the firm is in distress.
Sample firms' investment proxied by capital expenditure scaled by assets is significantly worse than their industry during the three-year period. At year -1, sample firms' median capex/assets is 0.0147 versus industry median of 0.0414. Moreover, sample firms' median capex/assets declines sharply over the three years period, from 0.0147 to 0.0054.
In summary, from the results shown in Table 3 , it can be seen that distressed firms significantly under-perform their industry median across a range of financial and operating variables, even in the year prior to distress. Indeed distressed firms have statistically and economically significantly higher level of leverage than their industry in the year prior to distress. Distressed firms' leverage ratios deteriorate during distress. There are also signs of our sample firms having difficulty to pay back their suppliers. In addition, there are dramatic declines in sales and significant reductions in capital expenditure prior to the onset of distress. Table 4 is constructed adapting the methodology of Asquith et al. (1994) , in order to assess the relative importance of the two factors discussed in section 3.1, i.e., leverage and firm level Insert Table 4 here Insert Figure 1 here Panel A shows that relatively poor operating performance is the primary feature of firm distress, not leverage. A median of 94% cash flow shortfall is caused by poor operating performance;
CAUSE OF DISTRESS (ECONOMIC VS FINANCIAL)
only 5% cash flow shortfall is caused by leverage. As for the subgroups, Subgroup 1 has the highest leverage effect and Subgroup 5 has the lowest leverage effect. Even in subgroup 1, however, 79% of cash flow shortfall is caused by operating performance.
Importantly, Panel B shows that at year -1, leverage factor plays a more important role in causing cash flow shortfall, for the full sample as well as for Subgroup 1 and 5. Thus, for the full sample in the year prior to distress, a mean of as much as 55% of the cash flow shortfall is due to leverage, compared with only 6.5% a year later. However, the contrast in the leverage effect between year -1 and 0 using median values is not as dramatic as mean value, albeit with the same trend. Figure 1 shows that except Subgroup 4 (the subgroup with the second lowest leverage effect in year 0), all other subgroups have a greater financial leverage effect in causing cash flow shortfall in year -1 then in year 0. Our explanation is that firms facing financial distress and liquidity constraints in the year prior to distress cut back their investment, and this reduction in investment results in severe underperformance at the operating level in the year of distress. The evidence on investment (capital expenditure trend) is examined in the next subsection. Table 5 presents a summary of distressed firms' capital expenditure (capex) between a three years window: one year prior to the onset of distress (t=-1), the first year of coverage shortfall (t=0), and the second year of coverage shortfall (t=+1). Capital expenditure growth rates are calculated as current year capital expenditures less previous year capital expenditures divided by previous year capital expenditures. Panel A computes capex growth rates between year -1 and 0, year 0 and +1, and year -1 and +1. In Panel B, we separate the sample into SOE and non-SOE subgroups and repeat the calculation on capital expenditure growths. We employee the Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its Z-statistics) as our test for significance for the difference in median growths rates between SOE firms and non-SOE firms.
LIQUIDITY AND THE SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
Insert Table 5 here
Panel A shows that between year -1 and 0, adjusted by industry, 75% of distressed firms reduce capital expenditure by a median of 61%; between year -1 and +1, adjusted by industry, 84% distressed firms reduce capital expenditure by a medina of 111%. In addition, from Table 3 we can see that firm capital expenditure scaled by assets in year -1 is 0.015, and this reduced to 0.010 in year 0 and again to 0.005 in year +1. So the reduction in capital expenditure is not just due to reductions in assets.
Panel B provides evidence for the existence of soft budget constraints for distressed SOE firms.
Between year -1 and 0, non-SOE firms reduce their Capex at a much greater rate (both statistically and economically) than their SOE counterpart. The median industry adjusted capex growth rate between year -1 and 0 for non-SOE firms is -96%, and the median figure for SOE firms is only -36%.
We repeat the analysis on assets and find the results very similar to Table 5 so the results are not reported here 17 . The results from Table 5 suggest that distressed firms reduce capital expenditure to provide much needed liquidity. Evidence also suggests the existence of soft budget constraints for SOE firms and hard budget constraints for the non-SOE firms, with distressed SOEs facing liquidity constraints, albeit to a lesser extent than their non-SOE counterparts. To fully understand the characteristics of the distressed SOEs we also repeat the univariate analysis for the 51 distressed SOEs. The results are presented in Table 6 .
Insert Table 6 here
The results in Table 6 are very similar to those of the full sample analysis reported in Table 3 .
Overall the distressed SOE firms experience poor performance across all categories during distress. Prior to distress, they are more leveraged than their industry and their operating performance is also significantly worse than their industry median. Of particular interest and different to the full sample, the distressed SOEs industry-adjusted gross profit margin is negative and is statistically different from zero, suggesting that the distressed SOEs are less efficient than their respective industries.
The analysis in this subsection shows that the distressed SOEs significantly reduce investment over and above their industry median level, and that their performance overall is significantly worse than their industry. In the context of soft budget constraint, the SOE firms selected by our distress selection procedure are indeed distressed, albeit with different investment behaviour when facing distress. The existence of soft budget constraint does not seem to save the distressed 17 The results are available upon request.
SOEs being distressed, as these SOEs demonstrate deteriorating financial and operating performance relative to their industry, similar to the full sample of distressed firms.
DETERMINANTS OF DISTRESS
In this section, we conduct multivariate analysis to take account of the relative influence of the various factors discussed in the previous subsections. As discussed in section 3.2, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes on the value of zero if the firm becomes distressed during the period of study, and one if otherwise. Independent variables include accounting ratios from year -1, measuring the financial and operating performance of sample firms. Other variables include ownership, market (tradability) and geographic location. The sample consists of the 100 distressed firms and 84 matching non-distressed sample firms. The 84 matching firms are selected by matching industry SIC and year, and then choosing the firm with interest coverage ratio equal or closest to the industry median 18 .
Our previous analyses provide strong associations between distress and firm performance one year prior to the onset of distress. In particular, we find that in year -1, the median earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortisation scaled by assets (EBITDA/assets) of the distressed firms are significantly lower than their industry median, and these distressed firms face severe liquidity constraints. In addition, distressed firms' industry adjusted median sales/assets is low. Finally, the cause of distress analysis shows that in year 0, the key feature of distress is poor operating performance, contributing to 96% of coverage shortfall.
As such we expect that firm operating and financial performance and investment behaviour in the year prior to distress have a significant effect on the probability of distress. We also expect that operating performance has a greater effect on the probability of distress than financial performance. Table 7 reports the regression results. We report the coefficients, the associated zstatistics and the marginal effects. As a standard practice, since the coefficients in logit 18 Some of the 100 distressed firms have the same 4-digit SIC, in this case we only choose one matching healthy firm for this 4-digit SIC industry. This is why there are fewer matched firms than distressed firms.
regressions cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect of a unit change of the independent variables on the probability of distress, we also report the marginal effects in the table.
Insert Table 7 here
We report seven specifications for the regression. Specifications (1) and (2) show that SALAS, EBITDAAS and CAPEXAS are all significant at the 1% level and the signs are as expected. The marginal contributions by CAPEXAS and EBITDAAS are much larger than that by TLIABAS, indicating that a unit change in EBITDAAS and CAPEXAS has a greater influence on the probability of distress than a unit change in TLIABAS. DSOE and DSOEO are not significant but the signs are positive, as predicted. In other words, being controlled by the State results in a lower probability of being distressed, consistent with the soft budget constraints hypothesis.
Specification (3) removes the state dummies but introduces the Floating variable. The overall test
statistics for the regression demonstrated by the McFaddden R 2 and Loglikelihood improve, while SALAS, EBITDAAS and CAPEXAS are still significant with similar magnitudes in their marginal contribution to the probability of distress. Floating has a negative but significant coefficient. The interpretation of this coefficient is somewhat complicated. As discussed in Section 3.2, this variable can be viewed as a proxy for governance, as a larger number of tradable shares signals transparency in management. However it also means that, since shareholders are more dispersed, coordination failure may occur in the event of performance decline/distress. The negative sign shows the higher the floating ratio, the more likely the firm is distressed. Our explanation is that in this case, the effect of coordination failure dominates the governance effect.
Specification (4) (1) and (2), and is also insignificant.
In summary, overall the investment, operational and financial performance variables are statistically significant, mostly at the 1% level, and the signs are as expected. However the marginal contributions to the probability of distress by investment and operational variables are much larger than those of the financial variables. This confirms our previous analyses that the main cause of distress is poor operating performance and lack of investment. The location dummy variable is significant while the state control variables are not significant in the logit model, although the sign is as expected.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
For a robustness check, we use the two alternative methods defined in section 3.2 to locate distressed firms. Firstly we use the market returns approach and select firms at the bottom 5% of 
MARKET MEASURE SUBSAMPLE
We firstly repeat the univariate analysis on the 44 distressed firms and the results as shown in the table in Appendix 4A are very similar to the full sample. As shown in the table in Appendix 4B,
the cause of distress analysis shows that the main feature of distress at year 0 is poor operating 19 The results for the market measure subsample are reported in Appendix 4 and for the ST/PT measure subsample are reported in Appendix 5 performance, with operating factor contributing to 94% of cash flow shortfall. The mean and median operating and leverage factors are not very different from each other so the values are not as skewed as the full sample. In addition, in the year prior to distress, the leverage factor plays a more important role than in the year of distress itself, the mean leverage factor accounts for 34% of cash flow shortfall and the median leverage factor accounts for 15% of cash flow shortfall. So these results confirm those from the full sample, that leverage factor plays a greater role in year -1 than in year 0.
In the multivariate logit regression analysis, we repeat the standard procedure to derive the most appropriate specifications, i.e. by considering the correlation table and adopt the backward procedure, rather than merely using the significant independent variables from the full sample analysis. The results, as shown in the table in Appendix 4C, are again similar to those from the full sample, with EBITDAAS, CLIABAS (TLIABAS) and CAPEXAS significant at the 1% level, but the location dummy and the floating ratio are no longer significant.
ST/PT MEASURE SUBSAMPLE
Here we report the empirical analysis on the selected 74 ST firms. The univariate analysis again shows very similar results to the full sample, as shown in the table in Appendix 5A. The cause of distress analysis shows the same trend, i.e. leverage factor plays a greater role in causing cash flow shortfall in year -1 than in year 0, although the difference in magnitude is not as great as in the full sample (Appendix 5B).
The multivariate regression also confirms the results from the full sample, i.e., EBITDAAS, CAPEXAS and CLIABAS (TLIABAS) are significant at the 1% level. DSOE, DSOEO and STATE are not significant, as we can see in the table in Appendix 5C.
In summary, we select two distinct subgroups of distressed firms from our full sample of 100 firms, using two alternative distress definitions. We repeat the full empirical analyses on these two subsamples and the findings are very similar to the full sample. Thus we are content that our results are robust.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper analyses distressed firms' operating and financial performance and operating efficiency before and during the first two years of distress for 100 firms that became distressed between 1999 and 2003. We find that, prior to distress, distressed firms have statistically and economically significantly higher level of leverage than their industry, but very low sales and capital expenditure. In addition, their profitability is also significantly worse than their industry.
In our attempt to assess the relative contribution of leverage effect (financial distress) and operating performance effect (economic distress), we find that firm level poor operating performance is the main feature. In the first year of distress, the poor operating performance effect is responsible for 94% of distress firms' cash-flow shortfall and only the remaining 6% is caused by the leverage effect. Our results confirm the findings of Asquith et al. (1994) . In addition, we find that the leverage effect plays a greater role in the year prior to distress than it does during distress. Our findings support the view that financial renegotiations in distress in an emerging market context are inefficient. As for the cause of such inefficiency, in addition to information asymmetry, potential explanations include the lack of a timely financial renegotiation process for companies in distress.
Consistent with Asquith et al (1994) , distressed firms reduce capital expenditure dramatically.
Furthermore, we find that the distressed non-SOE firms experience a significantly greater reduction in capital expenditure and assets, both statistically and economically, than their SOE counterpart. We believe that as non-SOEs face hard budget constraints, they have no alternatives but to cut investment and firm size; whereas their SOE counterparts have soft budget constraints and the reduction of investment and firm size is less severe. Nonetheless, the fact that the distressed SOEs significantly reduce investment over and above their industry median level, and that their performance overall is significantly worse than their industry, suggests that in the context of soft budget constraint, the SOEs selected by our distress selection procedure are also distressed, albeit with different level of liquidity constraints when facing distress. The existence of soft budget constraints does not seem to save the distressed SOEs from being distressed.
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The multivariate logit regression confirms our results that distressed firms' significant reduction of capital expenditure prior to distress is a precursor of the subsequent distress. We also find that firms located in a major or coastal city have a better chance of avoiding distress. This finding is consistent with Wei et al (2003) . We repeat our empirical analyses on two subgroups selected by two alternative definitions of distress, and find our results robust. Using one single accounting measure, therefore, we identify a group of seriously distressed firms which perform poorly across a range of accounting categories. This suggests Chinese accounting data are more reliable than generally thought.
Our paper takes a step towards gaining an understanding of financial distress in China. As the most influential emerging economy, evidence from China forms an essential part of the distress literature in emerging markets and an integral part of the extended current literature on privatisation.
APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Official Share Classes
Source: Xu & Wang (1997) 20 Taking the Glass-Steagall Act of the US as a model, the Commercial Banking Law of China that came into effect in 1994 prohibits commercial banks from underwriting, holding or trading securities except for government bonds.
Classes Description State shares
Shares obtained by an institution, as a representative of the central government, on behalf of the State in exchange for the capital contribution made by the State. The institution can be the central government itself, local governments or wholly government-owned economic institutions. Although the shares are not tradable, they are transferable under the approval of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
Legal person shares
Shares owned by domestic institutions. A legal person in China is defined as a non-individual legal entity or institution. In official documents, domestic institutions include stock companies, non-bank financial institutions 20 and SOEs that have at least one non-state owner. Legal person shares can be transferred to other domestic institutions upon approval from the CSRC.
Nontradable shares Employee shares Employee Shares are offered to workers and managers of a PLC, usually at a substantial discount. Employee shares are registered under the title of the labour union covering that company, which also represents shareholding employees trying to exercise their rights. After a holding period of 6 to 12 months, the company may file with CSRC to allow its employees to sell the shares in the open market, but the directors, supervisors and the general managers may not transfer such shares during their term of office. This group of shares includes B-shares on domestic stock exchanges, H-shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and N-shares on the New York Stock Exchange. B-shares were available exclusively to foreign investors until 2001 when they were also made available to domestic investors. The B-shares market is separated from the A-shares market, with SHSE B-shares denominated in US dollars and SZSE B-shares denominated in Hong Kong dollars. H-shares and Nshares carry the same rights and obligations as the A-and B-shares, but they cannot be traded on domestic stock exchanges, although can be held by anyone.
The full detail on the calculation of relative contribution to financial distress by leverage and firm operating performance is shown below:
1. In order to calculate the leverage effect, we set the firm's (IntExp/assets) t=0 = industry median (IntExp/assets) t=0 , and keep the firm's assets figure unchanged, this way we get a calculated IntExp ^) (IntExp at t=0.
Therefore, the calculated cash-flow change is:
2. Similarly, to calculate the firm performance effect, we set the company's (EBITDA/assets) to equal the corresponding industry median (EBITDA/assets) at t=0, in order to get the calculated EBITDA for the firm ) (ÊBITDA . The cash-flow change relating to this effect is then:
Although all sample firms have been in distress for at least two years, the above three steps calculation was carried out using only the cash-flow changes from one year prior (t=-1) to the first year of shortfall (t=0), similar to Asquith et al (1994) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998) .
The sum of the two cash flow changes would take our sample firms' cash flows to those of the average firm in an average industry.
Thus the portion of distress caused by leverage is calculated as:
) ( t=-1 t=0 t=-1 t=0 t=-1 t=0 t=-1 t=0 t=-1 t=0 This table presents empirical results of the comparison of the 51distressed SOE firms with their industries, in terms of operating and financial performance, liquidity, employees, and investment, before and during the first year of coverage shortfall and during the second year of coverage shortfall (t=-1, 0, +1). For each empirical proxy we give median values of the proxy for the firm and its industry median, the median change in the proxy's value between firm and industry median, and a test of significance of the difference. We employee the Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its Z-statistics) as our test for significance for the difference between firm and industry median. Table 7 Determinants of distress This table shows nine specifications of logit regressions denoted by (1), (2), (3), etc., estimating the probability of distress (measured by interest coverage ratio<1 in two consecutive years). The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes on the value of zero if the firm become distressed during the period of study, and one if otherwise. The independent variables are accounting ratios from year -1, one year before the onset of distress. The sample consists of 100 distressed firms and 84 matching non-distressed sample firms. Not all variables are available for all firms. N denotes the number of observations for each specification. We categorise the independent variables into operational, financial, investment, ownership, market and geographic location. For the operational category, SALAS denotes the ratio of sales over assets; EBITDAAS denotes the ratio of earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortisation divided by assets. In the financial category, TLIABAS denotes the ratio of total liabilities over assets; CLIABAS denotes the ratio of current liabilities over assets. In the investment category, CAPEXAS denotes capital expenditure over assets. In the ownership category, DSOEO takes the value of one if the firm is under the absolute control of the State and zero otherwise; as a substitute for DSOEO, DSOE takes the value of one if the firm is under the relative control of the State and zero otherwise. Floating ratio denotes the tradability of the sample firms' equity shares; it is the ratio of the number of tradable shares over total shares (tradable + non-tradable). The coefficient of an independent variable is under the number of the regression specification; underneath the coefficient is its z-statistics. The number to the right of each coefficient is the marginal effect of the independent variable. 
